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THE MOST ABUSED PREROGATIVE:
EN BANC REVIEW IN THE UNITED STATES
COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT
Jody Brian Martin
I. INTRODUCTION
The United States Courts of Appeals, as originally established, consisted of
only three judges in each circuit.1 As the workload increased additional judges
were added, but the courts continued to sit in panels of three.2 Each of these panels
spoke with the authority of that circuit court.' The ever-increasing number of ap-
peals filed and difficulty in communications, however, led to inconsistent holdings
by panels within the same circuit.4 The appellate courts soon began to address this
problem by reviewing important cases en banc. S Justice Stewart articulated the
purpose of an en banc hearing when he stated:
The principal utility of determinations by the courts of appeals in banc is to en-
able the court to maintain its integrity as an institution by making it possible for a
majority of its judges always to control and thereby to secure uniformity and continu-
ity in its decisions while enabling the court at the same time to follow the efficient
and time-saving procedure of having panels of three judges hear and decide the vast
majority of cases as to which no division exists within the court.6
Although en banc hearings consistently make up less than one percent of the case-
load of the United States appellate courts, 7 they continue to serve the important
functions recognized by Justice Stewart.
The en banc process is especially important to the Fifth Circuit which has had a
historically larger number of en banc hearings than other circuits.' Several factors
contribute to the importance of en banc review in the Fifth Circuit. The amount of
1. Evarts Act, ch. 517, § 2, 26 Stat. 826 (1891).
2. A. Lamar Alexander Jr., Note, En Banc Hearings in the Federal Courts ofAppeals: Accommodating Institu-
tional Responsibilities (Part I), 40 N.Y.U. L. REv. 563, 570-71 (1965) [hereinafter Alexander].
3.28 U.S.C. § 46(c) reviser's note (1970).
4. H.R. REP. No. 1390, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4236, 4238.
5. See, e.g., Commissioner v. Textile Mills Sec. Corp., 117 F2d 62 (3d Cir. 1940) (en banc), affd, 314
U.S. 326 (1941). "En banc" means "in the bench" or "full bench" and allows a court which usually hears cases in
small panels to convene all of thejudges for a case in certain circumstances. Black's Law Dictionary 526-27 (6th
ed. 1990). Both the relevant statute authorizing en banc hearings (28 U.S.C. § 46 (1988)) and the applicable
federal rule (FED. R. APP. P. 35) use the spelling "in banc," but the terms "in banc" and "en banc" are apparently
interchangeable. They are distinguished in neither Black's Law Dictionary nor in case law. For consistency, this
Comment uses the spelling "en banc" due to its prevalent use in case law and literature.
6. United States v. American-Foreign S.S. Corp., 363 U.S. 685,689-90 (1960) (quoting Albert B. Maris,
Hearing and Rehearing Cases in Banc, 14 FR.D. 91,96 (1954)).
7. Michael E. Solimine, Ideology and En Banc Review, 67 N.C. L. REv. 29, 29-30 (1988) [hereinafter So-
liminel.
8. Id. at 42; see also id. at 45 tbl. 1.
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new appeals has risen steadily,' and there has also been an increase in the number
ofjudges. 0 Such circumstances may lead to a decrease in the control by a majority
of active judges over panel decisions and a resulting lack of uniformity in some
areas."1 In addition, the large geographic size and the large number ofjudges of the
Fifth Circuit make it difficult to maintain uniformity within its jurisdiction. 2 Part
of the motivation behind the division of the old Fifth Circuit into the current Fifth
and Eleventh Circuits was a recognition of the difficulty in maintaining uniformity
in such a large jurisdiction and the cumbersome nature of the en banc process.13
The current Fifth Circuit still uses the en banc process to resolve intra- circuit con-
flicts and to handle significant issues. This Comment looks at the development of
the en banc procedure in general and then focuses on the Fifth Circuit's recent rela-
tionship with this extraordinary process.
II. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND OF EN BANC REVIEW
IN THE FEDERAL COURTS OF APPEALS
The circuit courts of appeals were created in 1891 by the Evarts Act.1 4 This Act
provided that the courts of appeals would consist of three judges.' 5 Twenty years
later, section 117 of the Judicial Code of 1911 again provided that the circuit
courts should consist of three judges, but section 118 increased the number of
judgeships in three circuits.1 6 Until 1940, however, no court of appeals other than
the District of Columbia ever sat with more than three judges, 7 but in 1940 deci-
sions of the Ninth and Third Circuits came into conflict over the power to sit en
banc. A 1939 panel decision of the Ninth Circuit held that section 117 of the Judi-
cial Code of 1911 authorized a court of three judges and no more. a Despite this
holding, the Third Circuit began to hear cases en banc. 9 The Supreme Court
granted certiorari in Textile Mills Securities Corp. v. Commissioner" to resolve the
conflict. The Court stated that section 118 of the Judicial Code of 1911 impliedly
9. 1993 JUDICIAL BUSINESS OF THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT: CLERK'S RE-
PORT FOR THE PERIOD JULY 1992-JUNE 1993 i [hereinafter CLERK'S REPORT]. The number of new appeals in the
Fifth Circuit has risen from 4323 in 1988 to 6695 in 1993. Id.
10. See 28 U.S.C. § 44(a) (Supp. IV 1992) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 44(a)(1988)).
11. See generally Sheldon Goldman, Conflict on the U. S. Courts ofAppeals 1965-1971: A Quantitative Analy-
sis, 42 U. CIN. L. REV. 635 (1973); Peter M. Madden, Comment, In Banc Procedures in the United States Courts
of Appeals, 43 FORDHAM L. REv. 401 (1974) [hereinafter Madden].
12. H.R. REP. No. 1390, 96th Cong., 2d Sess. 4 (1980), reprinted in 1980 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4236, 4238-39.
13. Id.
14. Evarts Act, ch. 517, 26 Stat. 826 (1891).
15. Id. § 2.
16. Judicial Code of 1911, ch. 23 i, §§ 117-18, 36 Stat. 1087, 1131 (1911).
17. See Madden, supra note 11, at 402.
18. Lang's Estate v. Commissioner, 97 F.2d 867, 869 (9th Cir.), certified question answered, 304 U.S. 264
(1938).
19. See Commissioner v. Textile Mills Sec. Corp., 117 F.2d 62 (3d Cir. 1940) (en banc), affd, 314 U.S. 326
(1941).
20. 314 U.S. 326 (1941).
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amended section 117 and held that a court of appeals had the power to sit en
banc. 21
The decision of Textile Mills was essentially codified in section 46(c) of the Ju-
dicial Code of 1948.22 Section 46 provides that the majority of cases would still be
heard by three-judge panels unless a hearing or rehearing en banc was ordered by a
majority of the circuitjudges who were in regular active service.23 Neither section
46 nor Textile Mills set out any guidelines or procedures governing the use of the en
banc process.
The Supreme Court faced the en banc issue once again in 1953 in the case of
Western Pacific Railroad Corp. v. Western Pacific Railroad. 24 The Court held that
an appellate court could not be compelled to hold an en banc rehearing.2" A peti-
tioner could only suggest that a court hear the case en banc.26 Section 46 was a
grant of power to the courts of appeals so that they could order en banc review and
not the creation of a right in parties to compel such hearings.27 The Court, how-
ever, did state that the circuit courts should explain whatever procedures they used
to determine if en banc review was needed.28 This decision approved the develop-
ment of local rules by each circuit court to govern the en banc process. "The court
[of appeals] is left free to devise its own administrative machinery to provide the
means whereby a majority may order [an en band] hearing."29 The local rules
which developed, however, were not uniform and often did not fully explain the
processes used by the courts when considering en banc review.3" Only the Fifth
21. Id. at 331-35.
22. Judicial Code and Judiciary Act, ch. 646, § 46(c), 62 Stat. 869, 871 (1948) (codified as amended at 28
U.S.C. § 46(c) (1982)).
23. 28 U.S.C. § 46 (1982) (as amended). The statute reads in part:
(a) Circuit judges shall sit on the court and its panels in such order and at such times as the court directs.
(b) In each circuit the court may authorize the hearing and determination of cases and controversies by
separate panels, each consisting of three judges ....
(c) Cases and controversies shall be heard and determined by a court or panel of not more than three
judges . . . unless a hearing or rehearing before the court in bane is ordered by a majority of the circuit
judges of the circuit who are in regular active service. A court in bane shall consist of all circuit judges in
regular active service, or such number of judges as may be prescribed in accordance with section 6 of
Public Law 95486 (92 Stat. 1633), except that any senior circuit judge of the circuit shall be eligible to
participate, at his election and upon the designation and assignment pursuant to section 294 (c) of this title
and the rules of the circuit, as a member of an in banc court reviewing a decision of a panel of which such
judge was a member.
28 U.S.C. § 46(a)-(c) (1982).
Section 6 of Public Law 95-486 (92 Stat. 1633), which is referred to in subsection (c), is set out in a statutory
note to 28 U.S.C. § 41 (1982). 28 U.S.C. § 41 note (1982). It authorizes courts of appeals having more than 15
active judges to perform their en bane functions by such number of members as might be prescribed by the local
rule of the courts of appeals. Id. The Fifth Circuit which currently has 17judgeships (28 U.S.C. § 44 (Supp. IV
1992)) has not utilized this law to reduce the number ofjudges who sit on its en bane panel but still defines an en
banc court as composed of all active judges of the court. 5TH CIR. R. 35.
24. 345 U.S. 247 (1953).




29. Id. at 250.
30. Judah I. Labovitz, Note, En Banc Procedure in the Federal Courts ofAppeals, 111 U. PA. L. REV. 220,
221-27 (1962).
1994l
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Circuit listed any substantive criteria for determining if an en banc review was
warranted, and these requirements were identical to those promulgated later in
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 35(a).1
11. CURRENT RULES GOVERNING THE EN BANC PROCEDURE
A. Federal Rule 35
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 35 was adopted in 1968 under section
46(c) of the Judicial Code. 2 The current Rule 35 states:
(a) When Hearing or Rehearing in Banc Will be Ordered. A majority33 of the
circuit judges who are in regular active service 34 may order that an appeal or other
proceeding be heard or reheard by the court of appeals in banc. Such a hearing or
rehearing is not favored and ordinarily will not be ordered except (1) when consider-
ation by the full court is necessary to secure or maintain uniformity of its decisions,
or (2) when the proceeding involves a question of exceptional importance.
(b) Suggestion of a Party for Hearing or Rehearing in Banc. A party may suggest
the appropriateness of a hearing or rehearing in banc. No response shall be filed un-
less the court shall so order. The clerk shall transmit any such suggestion to the
members of the panel and the judges of the court who are in regular active service
but a vote need not be taken to determine whether the cause shall be heard or re-
heard in banc unless a judge in regular active service or a judge who was a member
of the panel that rendered a decision sought to be reheard requests a vote on such a
suggestion made by a party.
(c) Time for Suggestion of a Party for Hearing or Rehearing in Banc; Suggestion
Does Not Stay Mandate. If a party desires to suggest that an appeal be heard initially
in banc, the suggestion must be made by the date on which the appellee's brief is
filed. A suggestion for a rehearing in banc must be made within the time prescribed
31.5TH CIR. R. 25(a) (repealed 1968). See Note, En Banc Review in Federal Circuit Courts: A Reassessment,
72 MICH. L. REv. 1637, 1641 n.17 (1974).
32. The Federal Rules of Appellate Procedure were adopted by order of the Supreme Court on December 4,
1967, to be effective July 1, 1968. 389 U.S. 1065 (1967). See supra note 23 for partial text of§ 46 ofthe Judicial
Code.
33. What constitutes a "majority" has been a source of controversy. Several courts require an "absolute major-
ity" of active judges to grant en banc review. See United States v. Nixon, 827 F.2d 1019 (5th Cir. 1987), cert.
denied, 484 U.S. 1026 (1988); Zahn v. International Paper Co., 469 F.2d 1033 (2d Cir. 1972), affd, 414 U.S.
291 (1973). In these courts an active judge who is disqualified from voting on a suggestion for en banc consider-
ation may still be counted as a member of the court, and a majority of the voting judges may not be enough to
establish a majority of active judges. Thus, in Zahn, a minority of three active judges voting to deny en banc
consideration overcame four active judges voting to grant en banc review. Zahn, 469 F.2d at 1040-42. This was
achieved because there was a vacancy on the nine judge court, and one of the eight active judges had been dis-
qualified. Id.
34. The courts have had difficulty defining the term "judges in regular active service." The problem arose
when dealing with senior judges of a circuit and their relationship to the en banc process. In 1960, the Supreme
Court held that a senior judge could neither vote nor sit en banc. United States v. American-Foreign S.S. Corp.,
363 U.S. 685, 691 (1960). Congress, however, responded in 1963 by amending § 46(c) to provide that a retired
or senior circuit judge could sit on an en banc court if he had sat on the panel which heard the case. Act of Nov.
13, 1963, Pub. L. No. 88-176, 77 Stat. 331 (1963) (amending 28 U.S.C. § 46 (1962)). The senior judge,
though, may not vote on the suggestion for granting or denying en banc review. Moody v. Albermarle Paper Co.,
417 U.S. 622, 626-27; 28 U.S.C. § 46(c) (1988). Rule 35 also allows any judge who sat on a panel to call for a
vote on rehearing en banc, but if she is not an active member of the circuit court she may not vote to grant or deny,
nor actually sit en banc. Moody, 417 U.S. at 626-27.
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by Rule 40 for filing a petition for rehearing, whether the suggestion is made in such
petition or otherwise. The pendency of such a suggestion whether or not included in
a petition for rehearing shall not affect the finality of the judgment of the court of
appeals or stay the issuance of the mandate.3"
This rule was an attempt to establish uniformity of the criteria used to deter-
mine if a case was worthy of en banc review. 8 It was also aimed at establishing a
procedure whereby a party could ask a court for en banc review, but it did not pur-
port to affect the power of a court of appeals to, sua sponte, hold en banc hear-
ings.37 The Fifth Circuit, along with the other circuits, continued to publish local
rules and internal operating procedures as authorized by Western Pacific Railroad
Corp. v. Western Pacific Railroad.8 The Local Rules of the Fifth Circuit set out the
exact procedures to be used when contending with en banc suggestions within its
jurisdiction.
B. Fifth Circuit Rules
Local Rule 35 of the Fifth Circuit and the court's Internal Operating Procedures
supplement the processes set out in the federal rule .3 Aside from these procedural
rules, the Fifth Circuit also attempts to discourage filings of suggestions for en
banc review. Federal Rule 35 states that this type of review is not favored, but the
Local Rules of the Fifth Circuit make a much stronger assertion.
The initial statement in the Local Rules, citing the "serious call on limited judi-
cial resources" effected by a suggestion for en banc review, cautions parties against
filing a suggestion and asserts that the court is fully justified in imposing sanctions
of its own initiative.4" The Internal Operating Procedures of the court refer to the
extraordinary nature of a suggestion for rehearing en banc and characterize such
suggestions as "the most abused prerogative."41
This disfavor of en banc hearings can be seen in the fact that over the last five
years en banc reviews have made up less than one percent of the cases handled by
the circuit.42 In fact, as the number of new appeals filed has risen, the number of
en banc cases heard in the last three years has decreased.' In the fiscal year of
35. FED. R. APP. P. 35.
36. FED. R. APP. P. 35 advisory committee's notes.
37. Id.
38. 345 U.S. 247 (1953); see supra notes 24-29 and accompanying text.
39. See 5TH CIR. R. 35; 5TH CIR. INTERNAL OPERATING PROCEDURES [hereinafter 5TH CIR. lOP] 35.
40. 5TH CIR. R. 35.1.
41. 5TH CIR. IOP. 35. The Internal Operating Procedure for Fifth Circuit Rule 35 states:
A suggestion for rehearing en banc is an extraordinary procedure which is intended to bring to the atten-
tion of the entire Court a precedent-setting error of exceptional public importance or an opinion which
directly conflicts with prior Supreme Court or Fifth Circuit precedent. Alleged errors in the determina-
tion of state law, or in the facts of the case (including sufficiency of evidence), or error asserted in the
misapplication of correct precedent to the facts of the case, are matters for panel rehearing but not for
rehearing en banc.
Id.
42. CLERK'S REPORT, supra note 9, at i.
43. CLERK'S REPORT, supra note 9, at i. The Fifth Circuit heard 18 en banc cases in 1991, 9 in 1992, and 8 in
1993. Id.
1994]
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1993, 220 Suggestions for Rehearing En Banc were filed and only four were
granted. 44 The court also heard four en banc cases on its own motion in 1993." s
These are very small numbers when compared with the Fifth Circuit's regular ca-
seload,46 but en banc review allows the full court to speak on important issues. De-
termining what questions the court considers to be "important," however, is a
difficult inquiry which may only be resolved by considering both the relevant rules
and statutes along with previous cases heard en banc.
IV. EN BANC IN THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 35(a) states that an en banc hearing will
not be granted except "(1) when consideration by the full court is necessary to se-
cure or maintain uniformity of its decisions, or (2) when the proceeding involves a
question of exceptional importance."47 These two considerations give circuit
courts substantive standards on which to rely in reviewing suggestions for en banc
hearings, but there are no hard and fast definitions of these standards. Indeed, en
banc cases rarely fit neatly into one category or the other. Many times the court
will not state the reason for hearing the case en banc, and when reasons are given,
they are rarely confined to one category. A survey of recent cases, however, can be
used to identify generalities and characteristics of cases which are likely to be
heard en banc.
A. Maintaining Uniformity of Decision
The Fifth Circuit has held that a prior decision of the court- panel or en banc -
cannot be overruled except by an en banc hearing absent an "overriding Supreme
Court decision or a change in statutory law."48 Despite this rule, conflicting deci-
sions do occasionally surface within the circuit. These conflicts are rare, but they
must be dealt with en banc.
In United States v. Lambert,49 the Fifth Circuit affirmed the strict interpretation
of procedures for departing upward from sentencing guidelines, thus requiring the
sentencing judge to evaluate each sentence range above the defendant's assigned
category and explain why she chose a particular sentencing range rather than some
lesser range."0 This approach was set forth in United States v. Lopez"1 and con-
flicted with a line of cases advocating a more lenient standard.5 2 In Lambert the
44. CLERK'S REPORT, supra note 9, at 20. Of the 220 Suggestions, members of the court requested a poll to be
taken on seven of the cases; three of the polls were negative and four were successful. Id.
45. CLERK'S REPORT, supra note 9, at 20.
46. In 1993 there were 6695 new appeals filed with the Fifth Circuit. CLERK'S REPORT, supra note 9, at i.
47. FED. R. App. P. 35(a).
48. United States v. Don B. Hart Equity Pure Trust, 818 F.2d 1246, 1250 (5th Cir. 1987) (citing Girald v.
Drexel Burnham Lambert, Inc., 805 F.2d 607, 610 (5th Cir. 1986)); United States v. Lewis, 475 F.2d 571, 574
(5th Cir. 1973); see also I GEORGE K. RAHDERT & LARRY M. ROTH, APPEALs TO THE FIFTH CIRcurT MANUAL ch.
15, at 22 & n.86 (1991) [hereinafter RAHDERT].
49. 984 F.2d 658 (5th Cir. 1993) (en banc).
50. Id. at 661-64.
51.871 F.2d 513 (5th Cir. 1989).
52. See, e.g., United States v. Harvey, 897 F.2d 1300 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 498 U.S. 1003 (1990).
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Fifth Circuit compared its law to that of other circuits and to recent Supreme Court
decisions.5 3 The court noted that several other circuits had adopted the Lopez ra-
tionale and then embraced this rule for themselves."
The Fifth Circuit faced another conflict when it considered the terms of section
933 of the Longshore and Harbor Workers' Compensation Act"5 [hereinafter
LHWCA] in Nicklos Drilling Co. v. Cowart.6 Section 933 contained an approval
requirement which conditioned eligibility for continuing LHWCA benefits on the
employer's and the employer's insurance carrier's prior written approval of any
settlement between an injured employee and a third party for less than his
LHWCA compensation entitlement.5 7 In 1984 Judge Politz authored an unpub-
lished opinion accepting the interpretation given to section 933 by the Director of
the Office of Workers' Compensation Program." The Director's interpretation
limited the approval requirement to those instances where the employer or its car-
rier was paying LHWCA benefits at the time of the settlement.5 9 Three opinions,
however, were later published which rejected the Director's interpretation, relying
instead on the plain meaning of the statute.60
The court heard Nicklos Drilling Co. v. Cowart1 en banc to resolve the conflict.
The en banc court held the approval requirement was not limited to the time when
the injured employee was receiving compensation benefits, rejecting Judge Po-
litz's and the Director's view.62 Judge Politz filed a dissenting opinion in which
Judges King and Johnson joined.63
When an en banc hearing spawns a dissenting opinion, the effectiveness of the
en banc decision becomes questionable. If a hearing of this type fails to establish
unanimity among the judges, the conflict becomes highlighted rather than re-
solved. The precedential value of such a decision, especially in front of the dis-
senters' panel, then becomes a dubious proposition. ' If such a case is not accepted
as precedent, the time and cost associated with the en banc process become super-
53. Lambert, 984 F.2d at 661-63.
54. Id.
55.33 U.S.C. §933 (1988).
56. 927 F.2d 828, 833 (5th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (per curiam), affd, 112 S. Ct. 2589, and cert. denied sub
nom. Barger v. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc., 112 S. Ct. 3026 (1992). Nicklos was consolidated with Petroleum
Helicopters, Inc. v. Barger, 910 F.2d 276 (5th Cir. 1990), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3026 (1992), for rehearing en
banc. Nicklos, 927 F.2d at 829-30.
57.33 U.S.C. §933 (1988).
58. Nicklos, 927 E2d at 833 (Politz, J., dissenting) (citing Arrow Contractors v. OWCP, 729 F.2d 777 (5th
Cir. 1984) (mem.)).
59. Id. at 830.
60. Nicklos Drilling Co. v. Cowart, 907 E2d 1552 (5th Cir. 1990), affd on reh'g, 927 F.2d 828 (5th Cir.
1991) (en banc) (per curiam), affd, 112 S. Ct. 2589 (1992); Petroleum Helicopters, Inc. v. Barger, 910 F.2d 276
(5th Cir. 1990), affd on reh'g sub noma. Nicklos Drilling Co. v. Cowart, 927 F.2d 828 (5th Cir. 1991) (en banc)
(per curiam), affd, 112 S. Ct. 2589, cert. denied sub nom. Barger v. Petroleum Helicopters, Inc., 112 S. Ct.
3026 (1992); Petroleum Helicopters, Inc. v. Collier, 784 F.2d 644 (5th Cir. 1986).
61. Nicklos, 927 F.2d at 829.
62. Id. at 832.
63. Id. at 833-34 (Politz, J., dissenting).
64. Alexander, supra note 2, at 582-85.
19941
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fluous expenditures of judicial resources. The infrequent use of the en banc proc-
ess, though, lends impact to the precedential value of even a divided en banc court.
An outvoted minority may still try later to overlook the majority view,6" but this is
less likely if the court has established an authoritative en banc precedent.
66
The authorization of Federal Rule of Appellate Procedure 35 to "maintain uni-
formity of decision" allows the circuit court to use the en banc process to resolve
intra-circuit conflict. However, apart from this type of conflict, the goal of main-
taining uniformity is unlikely to justify en banc review on its own. Most of the
Fifth Circuit cases examined seem to also meet the "exceptional importance" crite-
ria. 7 In fact, one could easily consider the need to "maintain uniformity" as a mat-
ter of "exceptional importance" under Federal Rule 35. Viewed in this manner, any
distinction between the two goals is rendered arbitrary and artificial. This is fur-
ther supported by the fact that no Fifth Circuit case examined refers to either aim
of the federal rule specifically. If an opinion states the reason for accepting the
case en banc, it does so in terms of the specific issues of that case. Most en banc
cases fall under the "exceptional importance" umbrella and should be analyzed as
such.
B. Questions of Exceptional Importance
1. Overruling Precedent and Creating New Law
68
The Fifth Circuit considers a great many issues, most of which may be disposed
of by relying on prior precedents. Occasionally, however, the court will recognize
the need to create new law in an effort to adjust its jurisprudence and take into ac-
count rights and substantive issues which may not have been previously consid-
ered. Even if the issue is one of first impression and no precedents need be
overruled, the court may wish to speak authoritatively through an en banc hear-
ing. In Rohner Gehrig Co. v. Tri-State Motor Transit,69 the court adopted the sub-
stantial compliance standard and the Hughes test from the Seventh Circuit" when
considering whether or not a bill of lading complies with the tariffs filed with the
Interstate Commerce Commission by a carrier.71 This case established a new rule,
but did not overrule any previous cases. The en banc court accepted the view of
Judge Wiener's dissent to the panel decision, using the en banc rehearing to articu-
65. See, e.g., United States v. Lambert, 984 F.2d 658, 661-62 (5th Cir. 1993) (en banc).
66. Madden, supra note 11, at 409.
67. FED. R. App. P. 35(a).
68. Although the cases in the previous section also overruled prior precedents, they are not included here.
Section IV. A. concentrated on cases seeking to resolve intra-circuit conflicts of precedents. This section focuses
on cases where the court overrules precedents in favor of a new rule and cases where the court adopts a rule to
address an issue of first impression within the circuit.
69. 950 F.2d 1079 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
70. The Hughes test requires a carrier to (1) maintain a tariff within the prescribed guidelines of the Interstate
Commerce Commission; (2) obtain the shipper's agreement as to his choice of liability; (3) give the shipper a
reasonable opportunity to choose between two or more levels of liability; and (4) issue a receipt or bill of lading
prior to moving the shipment. Hughes v. United Van Lines, Inc., 829 F.2d 1407 (7th Cir. 1987), cert. denied,
485 U.S. 913 (1988).
71. Rohner Gehrig Co., 950 F.2d at 1081.
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late what the majority of circuit judges considered to be the correct standard.72
Cases of first impression such as Rohner Gehrig are rare. Most cases creating law
involve overruling precedents.
Precedents in the Fifth Circuit may only be overruled by an en banc court; thus,
cases rejecting precedents will always be handed down by the full court.73 United
States v. Bachynsky74 eliminated the rule of per se reversal if a court failed to make
reference to or explain the effect of a supervised release term to a criminal defend-
ant,75 and, by doing this, the en banc court overruled the line of cases beginning
with United States v. Molina-Uribe.7" The Fifth Circuit interpreted Federal Rule of
Criminal Procedure 11 as addressing three core concerns: whether a guilty plea
was coerced, whether the defendant understood the nature of the charges, and
whether the defendant understood the consequences of his plea.78 Failure to ad-
dress one of these core concerns resulted in the vacation of a defendant's convic-
tion and remand to the district court so that the defendant could plead anew."9 If
there was only a partial failure to address a core concern, however, the colloquy
was reviewed under the harmless error standard of Rule 11 (h).8"
The question involved in Bachynsky was whether failure to explain the effect of
a supervised release term is a "total" or "partial" failure to address a core concern
of Rule 1 " Considering the rule of per se reversal when the court fails to address
supervised release in the plea colloquy, the court found the rule inconsistent with
both the plain language of the Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11 (c)(l) and the
advisory committee's notes to Rule 11 (h). 82 The en banc court then surveyed the
law of other circuits and rejected the per se reversal rule.83 This case is an example
of the court's willingness to overrule precedent which seems to have no solid foun-
72. Id. See also Rohner Gehrig Co. v. Tri-State Motor Transit, 923 F.2d 1118, 1123-27(5th Cir. 1991) (Wie-
ner, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part), rev'd, 950 F.2d 1079 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
73. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
74. 934 F.2d 1349 (5th Cir.) (en banc) (per curiam), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 402 (1991).
75. Id. at 1362. The Fifth Circuit later took the case of United States v. Johnson, I F.3d 296 (5th Cir. 1993)
(en banc), for the "'housekeeping' purpose of deciding whether to complete the process [they] began two years
ago with [the] en banc opinion in United States v. Bachynsky." Johnson, I F.3d at 297. In Johnson the court repu-
diated the requirement of determining if error in the plea colloquy was a failure of the court to comply with a core
concern. Id. at 297-98. Judge Wiener characterized this decision as going "the remaining 'half the distance to the
goal' of fully embracing section (h)" of Federal Rule of Criminal Procedure 11. Id. at 298.
76. 853 F.2d 1193 (5th Cir. 1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1022 (1989).
77. Rule I I deals with pleas made by a defendant. FED. R. CRIM. P. I1.
78. See United States v. Bachynsky, 924 F.2d 561, 564 (5th Cir.), rev'dper curiam, 934 F.2d 1349 (5th Cir.)
(en banc), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 402 (1991).
79. Id.
80. Id.
81. United States v. Bachynsky, 934 F2d 1349, 1351 (5th Cir.) (en banc) (per curiam), cert. denied, 112 S.
Ct. 402 (1991).
82. Id. at 1356-58.
83. Id. at 1358-61.
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dation. The court itself characterized the overruled line of cases as inapposite to
"logical and obvious" observations which dictate against those cases' holdings.84
Other instances of the en banc court overruling precedents include Phillips v.
Marine Concrete Structures, Inc. 8 In a case prior to Phillips, a panel of the Fifth
Circuit held that section 910(f) of the LHWCA allowed annual cost of living ad-
justments for the period of an injured worker's "temporary total disability."86 Sec-
tion 910(f), however, refers only to adjustments for "permanent total disability."87
In Phillips the court began by examining the words of the LHWCA, 8 and, finding
the words of the statute unambiguous, the court overruled the prior case which
conflicted with the majority of the judges' reading of the statute.89
Also, in United States v. Zuniga-Salinas,9  the appellate court overturned Her-
man v. United States,9 a decision which had been widely criticized. 2 The Herman
court, without citing any authority, held that a verdict against one co-conspirator
will not stand where all others are acquitted. 3 An intervening Supreme Court de-
cision addressed the issue indirectly, stating that inconsistent decisions could be
attributed to compromise, mistake, or leniency and should not be a bar to a guilty
verdict. 4 Noting this decision, Herman's lack of authority, and other circuit deci-
sions, the Fifth Circuit held that "[a]n inconsistent verdict should no longer be a
bar to conviction. . .."95
The common thread running through the previous three cases is the court's use
of the en banc process to overrule precedent. The court looked for guidance in
these cases from other circuits,9" Supreme Court opinions,97 and the statutes and
rules involved in the cases.98 All of these factors as well as scholarly and profes-
sional criticism of a ruling will enter into the judges' decisions to grant an en banc
hearing. Overruling previous panel or en banc decisions is an action which judges
are reluctant to take. The court overruled precedent in the previous cases only
when it was convinced that the governing standard was contradicted by a statute
84. Id. at 1356. United States v. Anderson, 885 F.2d 1248 (5th Cir. 1989) (en banc), is another example of a
case that the court took en banc to overrule a line of cases which the majority considered to be "aberrational."
Anderson, 885 F.2d at 1249.
85. 895 F.2d 1033 (5th Cir. 1990) (en banc).
86. Holliday v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 654 F.2d 415 (5th Cir. 1981).
87. 33 U.S.C. § 910(f) (1988).
88. Philips, 895 F.2d at 1035; see also 33 U.S.C. §§ 901-950 (1988).
89. Philips, 895 F.2d at 1035-36. See also Holliday v. Todd Shipyards Corp., 654 F.2d 415 (5th Cir. 1981).
90. 952 F.2d 876 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
91. 289 F.2d 362 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 368 U.S. 897 (1961).
92. See Zuniga-Salinas, 952 F.2d at 877.
93. Herman, 289 F.2d at 368.
94. United States v. Powell, 469 U.S. 57, 65 (1984).
95. Zuniga-Salinas, 952 F.2d at 878.
96. Id.; United States v. Bachynsky, 934 F.2d 1349 (5th Cir.) (en banc) (per curiam), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
402 (1991).
97. Zuniga-Salinas, 952 E2d at 877-78.
98. Bachynsky, 934 F.2d at 1356-58; Phillips v. Marine Concrete Structures Inc., 895 F.2d 1033, 1034-36
(5th Cir. 1990) (en banc); United States v. Anderson, 885 E2d 1248, 1250-51 (5th Cir. 1989) (en banc).
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and the current legal thinking on the issue. Even if these factors are present in a
case, however, they provide no guarantee that the court will overrule precedent. 9
2. Procedural Cases00
One of the goals of the en banc hearing is to allow a majority of judges to main-
tain control over panel decisions and the action of the circuit court in general.' 01 In
this era of crowded dockets, the courts are reluctant to take cases where jurisdic-
tion may be questionable. Interpreting procedural standards is one way the court
controls what types of substantive rights may be enforced in the federal courts,
thus allowing the judges to control, to some extent, the court's docket. 102 Young v.
Herring"3 demonstrates this principle.
In Young, Jerry Lynn Young sought habeas corpus relief after the Mississippi
Supreme Court affirmed his conviction for armed robbery.'04 The state court re-
jected the due process claim, holding that a procedural failure barred the claim.'
If the state court relied on an adequate and independent state ground to support its
judgment, this would prevent a federal court from taking the case.0 6 If the claim
ruled on by the state court was interwoven with federal law, however, there should
be a plain statement that the state court relied on state law to support the deci-
sion.'0 7 A panel of the Fifth Circuit held that the state court's decision in Young was
ambiguous and lacked a plain statement, and the federal court could take jurisdic-
tion.' 08 The en banc court reversed the panel, holding that the state procedural bar
precluded federal habeas corpus review even though the state decision contained
no plain statement.' 09 This decision rejected jurisdiction where state law may be
99. See, e.g., Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (continuing to
use the Frye standard for admission of expert testimony despite increasing criticism).
100. The term "procedural law" is used as distinct from substantive law and focuses on questions of how cases
may properly be brought before a particular court. JACK H. FRIEDENTHAL ET AL., CIVIL PROCEDURE § 1.1 (2d ed.
1993).
101. Madden, supra note 11, at 402.
102. See, e.g., Apache Bend Apartments, Ltd. v. United States, 987 F.2d 1174 (5th Cir. 1993) (en bane) (hold-
ing taxpayers lacked standing to challenge the constitutionality of the Tax Reform Act's transition rules); Derden
v. McNeel, 978 F.2d 1453 (5th Cir. 1992) (en bane) (rejecting formulation of cumulative error theory that allows
easier access to federal habeas corpus relief), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 2928 (1993); Society of Separationists,
Inc. v. Herman, 959 F.2d 1283 (5th Cir.) (en bane) (holding that a prospectivejuror lacked standing to seek pro-
spective relief), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 191 (1992); United States v. Vontsteen, 950 F.2d 1086 (5th Cir.) (en
bane) (holding that constitutional right is lost due to failure to comply with contemporaneous objection rule),
cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 3039 (1992); United States v. Shaid, 937 F.2d 228, (5th Cir. 1991) (en bane) (applying
cause and prejudice test strictly), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 978 (1992).
103. 938 F.2d 543 (5th Cir. 1991) (en bane), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 978 (1992).
104. Young v. State, 420 So. 2d 1055 (Miss. 1982), habeas corpus granted sub nor. Young v. Herring, 917
F.2d 858 (5th Cir. 1990), rev'd en banc, 938 F.2d 543 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1485 (1992).
105. Id. at 1057-58.
106. See, e.g., Young v. Herring, 938 F.2d 543, 548-50 (5th Cir. 1991) (en bane), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
1485 (1992); Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255 (1989).
107. Coleman v. Thompson, 111 S. Ct. 2546 (1991); Harris v. Reed, 489 U.S. 255 (1989).
108. Young v. Herring, 917 F2d 858, 864 (5th Cir. 1990), rev'd en banc, 938 F.2d 543 (5th Cir. 1991), cert.
denied, 112 S. Ct. 1485 (1992).
109. Young, 938 F.2d at 546.
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sufficient to support the conclusion, thus reducing duplicative litigation in the fed-
eral courts.
Many times the circuit court will decide procedural cases en banc to articulate
standards and procedures that are to be used by the federal courts within the cir-
cuit.11 Decisions on procedural matters are vitally important to district courts be-
cause these points may be involved in a great number of cases at the trial level. The
circuit judges are very aware of this importance. 1 ' In Christophersen v. Allied-Sig-
nal Corp. ,12 for example, the court attempted to settle the issue as to what stand-
ard should be used to determine if expert testimony should be admitted in a
trial." 3 This matter had generated a great amount of controversy in the legal com-
munity nationwide." 4
The conflict arose from two competing standards governing admission of sci-
entific evidence into a trial. The first originated with Frye v. United States. 1 5 This
standard imposed the burden that evidence was admissable only if it was generally
accepted by the relevant scientific community. 6 The second approach was to
treat scientific evidence as any other type of evidence and weigh its probative
value against countervailing dangers.' This latter approach corresponds to the
Federal Rules of Evidence." 8 At the time Christophersen was heard, the Frye
method had come under fire from an increasing number of courts and scholars.' '
Despite this criticism, however, the Fifth Circuit recognized the continuing vital-
ity of the Frye test in Christophersen20 and used the test in conjunction with the
Federal Rules of Evidence to determine if expert scientific testimony was admissi-
ble.
121
In Kelly v. Lees Old Fashioned Hamburgers, Inc. ,22 the Fifth Circuit, en banc,
addressed another procedural topic. Rule 54(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil Pro-
cedure allows a court to enter final judgment on less than all of the claims in a
case. 121 In order to use this procedure the court must make an "express determina-
110. Micheaux v. Collins, 944 F.2d 231 (5th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (holding that federal court need not accept
state court's "proposed findings" and affirming the federal trial court's de novo review), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct.
1226 (1992); Resolution Trust Corp. v. Montross, 944 F.2d 227 (5th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (holding that a party
cannot raise an issue for the first time before an en banc court).
11. Interview with Judge Charles C. Clark, Retired Chief Judge of the United States Court of Appeals for the
Fifth Judicial Circuit, in Jackson, Miss. (Sept. 20, 1993).
112. 939 F.2d 1106 (5th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (abrogated by Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993)), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1280 (1992).
113. Id. at 1108.
114. See, e.g., PAUL C. GIANNELLI & EDWARD J. IMWINKELRIED, SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE §§ 1-5 [hereinafter
GIANNELLI] (discussing the controversy thoroughly and listing authorities).
115. 293 F. 1013 (D.C. Cir. 1923).
116. Id. at 1014; GIANNELLI, supra note 114, at 9.
117. GIANNELLI, supra note 114, at 26-27.
118. GIANNELLI, supra note 114, at 26-27.
119. GIANNELLI, supra note 114, at 12-13 & nn. 70-75.
120. Christophersen v. Allied-Signal Corp., 939 F.2d 1106, 1110 (5th Cir. 1991) (en banc) (abrogated by
Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 113 S. Ct. 2786 (1993)), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 1280 (1992).
121. Id.
122. 908 F.2d 1218 (5th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (per curiam).
123. FED. R. CIV. P. 54(b).
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tion that there is nojust reason for delay" in issuing a final judgment on that partic-
ular part of the case.124 Without such a finding, the order is not considered a final
judgment and may not be appealed.125 Many circuit courts will accord partial
judgment finality under Rule 54(b) only if the district judge included the talis-
manic words "no just reason for delay" in the order.126 The Fifth Circuit consid-
ered the conflicting cases on this issue and held that an order lacking the recitation
of "no just reason for delay" may be directly appealed if the "language in the order
either independently or together with related parts of the record reflects the trial
judge's clear intent to enter a partial final judgment under Rule 54(b)."127
The circuit court decided both Kelly and Christophersen en banc to settle con-
flicting interpretations of procedural issues. Other procedural cases which seem
likely to attract en banc review are those involving standards which govern access
to the federal courts .12' There are, in addition, other discreet categories of cases
which form significant portions of the court's en banc docket.
3. Federal Statutory Law
En banc review is reserved for issues of "exceptional importance, ' 12' and issues
of federal statutory law seem to fit within the court's definitions of this require-
ment. It is not enough, though, that a claim is simply founded on federal law, nor
that there is a dispute as to the facts constituting the claim; en banc review is most
likely achieved by those cases involving issues not clearly addressed in a statute
itself and not yet defined by common law in the area. 130 In Bright v. Houston North-
west Medical Center Survivor, Inc. ,"'1 the court considered a case based on section
7(a)(1) of the Fair Labor Standards Act. 32 The issue was the definition of "work-
ing time" under the statute. 133 The plaintiff worked as an equipment repairman and
wished to have the time spent "on call" included in his working time. 134 A divided
panel of the court reversed the trial court's summary judgment against the plain-
124. Id.
125. See Kelly, 908 F.2d at 1219-20.
126. See, e.g., MOONEY v. FRIERDICH, 784 F.2D 875 (8TH CIR. 1986) (PER CURIAM); FRANK BRISCOE CO. v.
MoRuisoN-KNUDSEN CO., 776 F.2D 1414 (9TH CIR. 1985). See also Kelly, 908 F.2d at 1222 (Smith, J., dissent-
ing).
127. Kelly, 908 F.2d at 1220.
128. See supra notes 102-10 and accompanying text.
129. FED. R. App. P. 35(a).
130. See, e.g., Boureslan v. ARAMCO, 892 F.2d 1271 (5th Cir. 1990) (en banc) (applying Title VII outside
the United States), affd sub non. EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244 (1991); Mills v. Director
Office of Workers' Comp. Program, 877 F.2d 356 (5th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (considering scope of LHWCA as
incorporated in the Outer Continental Shelf Lands Act); International Bhd. of Teamsters v. Southwest Airlines
Co., 875 F.2d 1129 (5th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (classifying drug testing program under Railway Labor Act);
EEOC v. Mississippi State Tax Comm'n, 873 F.2d 97 (5th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (considering if physical fitness
could be a bona fide occupation qualification under the Age Discrimination in Employment Act).
131. 934 F.2d 671 (5th Cir. 1991) (en banc), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 882 (1992).
132. Id.; see also 29 U.S.C. § 207(a)(1) (1988).
133. Bright, 934 F2d at 674.
134. Id. at 673-74. The plaintiff worked a normal 40 hour week, but during his time off he was required to
wear a beeper so that he could be summoned for emergency repairs. Id.
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tiff. 13 The panel ruled that whether on call time is working time is a question for
the jury and precludes summary judgment. 136 The en banc court rejected this, stat-
ing firmly that on call time was not within the statute's provisions.37
Another case where the en banc court rejected a panel's interpretation of a fed-
eral statute was Plaisance v. Texaco, Inc. 138 The plaintiff was involved in a fire on a
tugboat in Louisiana coastal waters .139 The plaintiff alleged he was suffering from
post-traumatic stress disorder and sued for damages under the Jones Act.14 A
panel of the Fifth Circuit affirmed the dismissal of the plaintiffs suit, but, despite
this conclusion, the panel proceeded to hold that a plaintiff could recover for emo-
tional injuries under the Jones Act.141 The court, en banc, agreed with the dis-
missal of the case, but it rejected the panel's additional conclusion.142 The en banc
court stated that the facts of this case do not allow "us to decide whether . . . we
might permit recovery of damages for purely emotional injuries. " "'
The federal government has a special interest in interpreting its own laws uni-
formly through the federal courts?4 Interpretation of these federal statutes is an
area likely to attract en banc review. As demonstrated above, this is especially
likely to occur when a divided panel's interpretation of a statute breaks new ground
and will have potentially far- reaching results. Another area in which the federal
government may wish to promote uniformity of interpretation is that of constitu-
tional law.
4. Constitutional Rights
One area within constitutional law which is a frequent recipient of en banc re-
view is that of the Fourth Amendment. The vagueness of the Fourth Amendment
probable cause issue and the constantly evolving interpretations in this area ac-
count for its frequent appearance in en banc hearings. 141 Within the last five years
the Fifth Circuit has heard five Fourth Amendment cases en banc.1 46 In United
States v. Rideau,147 the divided en banc court ruled that touching the pants pocket
of the defendant was not an illegal search under the Fourth Amendment.1  This
135. Bright v. Houston N.W. Med. Center Survivor, Inc., 888 F.2d 1059, 1064 (5th Cir. 1989), rev'd en banc,
934 F.2d 671 (5th Cir. 1991), cert. denied, 112 S. Ct. 882 (1992).
136. Id.
137. Bright, 934 F.2d at 678.
138. 966 F.2d 166 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 604 (1992).
139. Id. at 167.
140. Id. at 168.
141. Id.
142. Id. at 168-69.
143. Id. at 169.
144. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 221 (1989).
145. Solimine, supra note 7, at 54.
146. United States v. Rideau, 969 F.2d 1572 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc); United States v. Ibarra, 965 F.2d 1354
(5th Cir. 1992) (en banc); United States v. Pierre, 958 F.2d 1304 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct.
280 (1992); United States v. De Leon-Reyna, 930 F.2d 396 (5th Cir. 1991) (en banc); United States v. Hurtado,
905 F.2d 74 (5th Cir. 1990) (en banc).
147. 969 F.2d 1572 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
148. Id. at 1574-76.
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expanded the scope of a reasonable search under the Fourth Amendment. 49 Also,
United States v. De Leon-Reyna"s applied the "good-faith exception" to a "stop" sit-
uation where the officer had received incorrect information over the radio."' 1 In
all of its Fourth Amendment cases, the en banc court followed the lead of the
United States Supreme Court in expanding the scope of lawful search and sei-
zure. 
1 5 2
The Fifth Circuit has reviewed, en banc, constitutional questions other than
Fourth Amendment issues only in very limited instances. Only two such cases
have been decided en banc in the past five years. Fleming v. Collins153 expanded
the public safety exception to the Miranda rules which protect Fifth Amendment
rights. 154 Kinsey v. Salado Independent School District.. was reviewed en banc to
consider the protection afforded by the First Amendment to a public school super-
intendent.15 6 Both of these cases, as well as the previously discussed Fourth
Amendment cases, were taken from divided panels and involved nebulous and
controversial issues.
Five of the seven en banc constitutional decisions discussed drew dissents. In
fact, one case resulted in an equally divided court, which by law affirms the lower
court decision.157 The divisiveness of the court attests to the controversial charac-
ter of these issues, and it is this uncertain nature which prompts the court's en banc
review of constitutional cases. In constitutional law, the court works to mold con-
cepts involving both legal and societal issues. An important and substantial body
of constitutional law where this intertwining of issues is prominent is the field of
civil rights.
149. Id.
150. 930 F.2d 396 (5th Cir. 1991) (en banc).
15 1. Id. at 401-02.
152. See, e.g., Minnesota v. Dickerson, 113 S. Ct. 2130 (1993) (allowing police to seize non-threatening con-
traband detected through the sense of touch during a frisk); Skinner v. Railway Labor Executives' Assoc., 489
U.S. 602 (1989) (allowing blood and urine tests for drugs without requiring a warrant or reasonable suspicion);
United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897 (1984) (allowing evidence obtained by an invalid warrant to be admitted to
trial because an officer had relied on it in good faith); Illinois v. Gates, 462 U.S. 213 (1983) (embracing the more
lenient "totality of the circumstances" test for determining if third party information established probable cause).
153. 954 F2d 1109 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
154. Id. at 1114.
155. 950 F.2d 988 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
156. Id. at 990.
157. United States v. Ibarra, 965 F.2d 1354 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc).
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5. Civil Rights
The subject of civil rights has been historically important to the Fifth Circuit
and should be discussed when examining the court's en banc process. 158 It is an
area where the courts have dealt with important issues, and the Fifth Circuit, con-
sisting exclusively of southern states, has been a leading forum for these issues.159
An excellent example is League of United Latin American Citizens v. Clements.1 0
This case wound its way through the federal court system for several years,"' pre-
senting a complex problem addressing the relationship between section 2 of the
Voting Rights Act 62 and the election of state trial judges in Texas.163 The plaintiffs
alleged that electing trial judges county-wide violated section 2 of the Voting
Rights Act by diluting the voting strength of minorities in the Texas system. 164 This
case confronted the broad issue of subtle discrimination by a state. The circuit
court heard a similar issue en banc in a case that alleged discrimination in the state
university system of Mississippi.165 These cases dealt with remnants of a segre-
gated system which the Fifth Circuit played a large role in disassembling. 16  Re-
solving these issues continues to be of great importance in the Fifth Circuit.
Another feature of the civil rights cases addressed by the court en banc involves
jury selection. The court reviewed the use of peremptory challenges by civil liti-
gants which were allegedly based on racial grounds in Edmonson v. Leesville Con-
158. See generally JOHN M. SPIVACK, RACE, CIVIL RIGHTS, AND THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR
THE FIFTH JUDICIAL CIRCUIT (1990) [hereinafter SPIVAK]; HARVEY C. COUCH, A HISTORY OF THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
1891-1981 chs. V-VI (1984) [hereinafter COUCH].
One en banc case not discussed in this Comment is Graham v. Collins, 950 F.2d 1009 (5th Cir. 1992) (en
banc). This case does not fall within any of the subject areas used in this Comment. Graham sought habeas relief
after he was sentenced to death. Graham, 950 F2d at 1013. A panel of the Fifth Circuit denied relief, and the
Supreme Court later remanded the case to be considered in light of a recent decision. Id. at 1011. A divided panel
then granted relief, but the en banc court disagreed with the panel and once again denied relief. Id. at 1034. Gra-
ham does not fit in with other en banc cases because the inquiry here was specific to the case at hand. The court
did not set out a new rule or address a controversial issue important to the court's functioning. This anomaly may
be accounted for because the case involved capital punishment and had been remanded by the Supreme Court
with specific directions that it be considered in light of a recent ruling. These facts could explain this case's char-
acterization by en banc review as a case of exceptional importance.
159. See generally SPIVACK, supra note 158; COUCH, supra note 158.
160. 999 F.2d 831 (5th Cir. 1993) (en banc).
161. A panel of the Fifth Circuit heard this case originally in 1990. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v.
Clements, 902 F.2d 293 (5th Cir. 1990). A majority of the court, sua sponte, ordered en banc rehearing. League
of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Clements, 914 F.2d 620 (5th Cir. 1990) (en banc). The Supreme Court of the
United States granted certiorari, consolidated the case with another, and reversed. Houston Lawyer's Ass'n v.
Attorney General, 111 S. Ct. 2376 (1991). On remand, a panel of the Fifth Circuit again heard the case. League
of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Clements, 986 F.2d 728 (5th Cir. 1993). Once again the court, sua sponte, or-
dered en banc rehearing. League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Clements, 999 F2d 831 (5th Cir. 1993) (en
banc).
162. Voting Rights Act of 1965, Pub. L. No. 89-110, 79 Stat. 445 (codified as amended at 42 U.S.C. §§ 1971,
1973 to 1973bb-1 (1988)).
163. League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 902 F.2d at 294-95.
164. League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 999 F.2d at 838. The charge of dilution was finally rejected by the
court. Id. at 893.
165. See Ayers v. Allain, 914 F.2d 676 (5th Cir. 1990) (en banc), vacated by United States v. Fordice, 112 S.
Ct. 2727 (1992).
166. See generally SPlVACK, supra note 158.
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crete Co., Inc.'67 Also, in United States v. Greer,'68 the court en banc approved a
trial court's refusal to strike members of certain races and religions in a hate crime
case. 169 Cases involving jury selection have been a persistent source of contro-
versy regarding civil rights. 0 Controversial issues involving subtle discrimina-
tion and civil rights violations appear quite often in the Fifth Circuit's caseload'71
and are likely candidates for en banc review.
V. CONCLUSION
Determining if a case is "enbancworthy"172 is an uncertain process which is of-
ten frustrating for litigants. The authorizations of Federal Rule of Appellate Proce-
dure 35 for hearing questions of exceptional importance and maintaining
uniformity within the circuit provide starting points for determining the result of
an en banc suggestion, but these aims must be filtered through at least a majority of
judges on the circuit. 73 While the examination and categorization of en banc cases
is helpful in determining which issues may precipitate en banc review, such a list-
ing does not indicate a limit on the court's discretion in this area. Each judge in the
circuit must decide what constitutes exceptional importance when deliberating on
a suggestion for en banc review. Many factors enter these considerations: the pro-
cedural posture, the subject matter, procedural elements, potential recurrence in
the courts, and current attitudes toward the issues involved. All of these different
factors make granting en banc review a very subjective endeavor for the court.
An attorney contemplating en banc review should keep in mind the unlikeliness
of actually achieving an en banc hearing. An en banc hearing should only be re-
quested when a case involves overruling bad precedents, resolving intra-circuit
conflict, addressing controversial standards or procedures, or "precedent-setting
error of exceptional public importance or an opinion which directly conflicts with
prior Supreme Court or Fifth Circuit precedent." '174 These suggestions will never
have a high rate of success due to the court's unwillingness to waste judicial re-
sources, 75 but, as demonstrated in this Comment, the court will hear en banc
those issues which affect the efficient functioning of the federal courts or which
address important areas of the circuit court's jurisprudence.
167. 895 F.2d 218 (5th Cir. 1990) (en banc), rev'd, 500 U.S. 614 (1991).
168. 968 F.2d 433 (5th Cir. 1992) (en banc), cert. denied, 113 S. Ct. 1390 (1993).
169. Id. at 434.
170. See, e.g., Powers v. Ohio, 499 U.S. 400 (1991); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986).
171. Civil rights cases consistently make up approximately 10% of the appeals filed in the Fifth Circuit.
CLERK'S REioR-r, supra note 9, at 2.
172. This term apparently originated with Chief Judge John R. Brown of the Fifth Circuit. Alan R. Gilbert,
Annotation, In Banc Proceedings in Federal Courts of Appeals, 37 A.L.R. FED. 274, 280 n.8 (1978).
173. See FED. R. App. P. 35(a).
174. 5TH CIR. lOP 35.
175. RAHDERT, supra note 48, at 32.
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